








Spacetime and Structure: Structural Realism, Neo-Kantianism Idealism, or Relativized A Priorism?

Abstract
The essay examines the relationship, within spacetime theories, between contemporary structural realism, Cassirer’s neo-Kantian structuralism, and Friedman’s defense of the relativized a priori. Despite Friedman’s claim that the relativized a priori can explain the progress of science, by using invariant theoretical elements/structures, our investigation will demonstrate that his theory cannot make this guarantee, nor may Cassirer’s earlier theory. However, as will be argued, the main content of both Cassirer’s and Friedman’s theories can be retained within an epistemic version of structural realism, thereby securing an account of scientific progress.


1. Introduction. The contemporary advocates of the structural realist (SR) brand of scientific realism can trace their theory’s lineage to a host of early twentieth century “structuralist” approaches to the sciences, principally, the philosophical speculation on the ontology, objectivity, etc., of mathematical physics put forward by Eddington, Weyl, Russell, and Cassirer. Nevertheless, in a series of important essays on the foundations of scientific theories, Michael Friedman insists that his conception of the relativized constitutive a priori, which owes much to the insights of Cassirer, “does not proceed on the basis of ‘scientific realism’. . .” (2001, 118), and, in fact, “is consistent with . . . ‘anti-realist’ conceptions of truth” (68n, original emphasis). Friedman’s work, which is largely dedicated to twentieth century spacetime theories, thus raises intriguing ontological and epistemological questions for both Cassirer’s Neo-Kantianism and the current SR brand of scientific realism; specifically, what is the relationship between structuralism, broadly construed, and realism? In this investigation, not only will it be argued that the best interpretation of both Cassirer’s and Friedman’s work is consistent with a limited epistemic form of scientific realism, but that Friedman’s own theory of scientific rationality is fatally compromised without a similar realist commitment. Following both Friedman and the majority of the early structuralists, our analysis will focus largely on the revolution in theories of spacetime physics sparked by, in particular, Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity (GTR). After diagnosing the difficulties with Friedman’s and Cassirer’s views (section 2), various complications with the SR approach will addressed (in section 3) as a means of demonstrating the advantages that SR has to offer the type of structuralism advocated by such neo-Kantians as Cassirer or Friedman. First, however, we will briefly survey the three major participants in the dispute.
	1.1. Structural Realism. As a departure from a straightforward realism involving theoretical entities, SR holds that what is preserved in successive theory change is the abstract mathematical or structural content of a scientific theory. There are two principle virtues associated with SR. First, SR can explain the progressive empirical success of scientific theorizing, and thereby avoid the “no miracles” argument, since the structures present in our best scientific theories actually pertain to, or capture in some manner, the “real” world (see sections 2 and 3). Yet, secondly, SR avoids the “pessimistic meta-induction” (that plagues entity realism) since it does not make an ontological commitment to the entities actually utilized by specific theories. A familiar example from the SR literature involves the progression in nineteenth century optics from Fresnel’s elastic sold ether theory to Maxwell’s electromagnetic field theory, since the mathematical structure of Maxwell’s field equations give Fresnel’s equations as a limiting case: “Fresnel’s equations are taken over completely intact into the superseding theory [Maxwell’s]—reappearing there newly interpreted but, as mathematical equations, entirely unchanged” (Worrall 1996, 160). On the ontological level of theoretical entities, Fresnel’s mechanical elastic solid is quite different from many of the non-mechanical interpretations offered Maxwell’s electromagnetic field; nonetheless, the mathematical structure of Fresnel’s theory is retained in Maxwell’s field equations.
	A current debate in the structural realist community pertains to the ontological and/or epistemological implications of the structures themselves. One view, dubbed epistemic structural realism (ESR), regards structure from a purely epistemological perspective, such that the mathematical structures in our best scientific theories do not provide any information on the actual ontology of entities and processes that underlie the observed structural relationships. The ontic structural realists (OSR), in contrast, reject a purely phenomenological interpretation of structure; rather, structures do reveal facts or truths about the underlying ontology—and may, in fact, be the underlying ontology (see, e.g., Chakravartty 2003). Characterizing the differences between ESR and OSR is a delicate matter, but it is probably safe to assume that both realist hypotheses agree on a fairly minimal ontological interpretation; namely, that the shared mathematical structures of successive scientific theories are not accidental facts, but are (somehow) grounded upon, or consequences of, the ontology of the real world. Accordingly, whereas the proponents of OSR will contend that the structures preserved across theory change can provide information on the actual ontology of the world, the supporters of OSR will maintain a strict neutrality, claiming instead that the underlying ontology might coincide with either a traditional entity realism or some form of OSR, but that we may never be able to tell (see, Brading and Landry 2004, for a similar minimalist interpretation). The “no miracles” argument, in effect, constitutes the main ontological commitment of ESR, for the theory predicts that the evolution of scientific theories will nevertheless continue to uphold an invariant mathematical structure. This prediction, of an invariant structure underlying theory change, might also mark an important distinction between ESR and the type of “epistemic structuralism” favored by anti-realists, such as van Fraassen (1999), since the anti-realists are not apt to endorse the “no miracles” argument that motivates ESR—or, put differently, any claim that future successful theories must retain certain mathematical structures would seem an unwarranted stipulation on a strict “empirical adequacy” thesis (and, although van Fraassen does step carefully around these issues, he clearly does not esteem “no miracles” thinking; 1999, 23-32).
	1.2. Early Structuralism. Given its thin ontological implications and obvious epistemic credentials, ESR bears much in common with the various conceptions of objectivity advanced by the early structuralists. On the whole, the transcendental idealism that characterizes the spacetime theorizing of Cassirer (via Marburg Neo-Kantianism), Weyl (via Husserlian phenomenology), and Eddington is neither realist nor anti-realist, but is best deemed as simply opposed to subjective idealism or relativism: see, Ryckman 2005, who refers to Eddington’s approach as “transcendental idealism shorn of ‘noumenalism’” (234), where “transcendental idealism” is “a metaphilosophical standpoint, beyond realism, idealism (or anti-realism)”, (287). As is well-known, the structuralists employed the geometrical concept of an invariant, as a geometrical object preserved within a group of coordinate transformations, to capture their new understanding of the objectivity of knowledge. This approach drew inspiration from Klein’s Erlanger program and Helmholtz, but received its most important impetus from the tensor calculus formulation of GTR. Overall, this branch of mathematics can be loosely described as the study of “what remains the same” (invariant) under different spatial perspectives—thereby demonstrating, in rough outline, how the objective features of geometry emerge from the subjective, as well as how a structure (the transformation group) provides this objective knowledge.
	Cassirer called his system, a “universal invariant theory of experience”, noting that the “procedure of the ‘transcendental philosophy’ can be directly compared” to geometry: “Just as the geometrician selects for investigation those relations of a definite figure, which remain unchanged by certain transformations, so here the attempt is made to discover those universal elements of form, that persist through all change in the particular material content of experience” (1910/1921, 268-269). In Substance and Function, Cassirer argues that the old conception of science, as disclosing the world’s underlying ontology (substances), must now be replaced by the more accurate estimation that regards science as obtaining a knowledge of the invariant mathematical interrelationships, framed by physical laws, (functions) manifest over the course of the empirical sciences.
	1.3. The Relativized A Priori. In several important essays, Michael Friedman has strived to resuscitate a conception of scientific knowledge that borrows elements from both Cassirer’s neo-Kantianism and the notion of a revisable a priori adopted by some of the Logical Positivists (e.g., the early Reichenbach, and Carnap). As Friedman notes (2000, 116-118), Cassirer’s understanding of scientific knowledge fits the Kantian classification of a purely “regulative” ideal, since the intellectual faculties alone determine the invariants of experience in a sort of abstract or reflective manner (such that this invariant content can only be established retrospectively). Friedman’s theory of scientific knowledge, on the other hand, would like to preserve some facet of the “constitutive” process in cognition, which for Kant involved both the understanding and sensibility in a synthesis that renders comprehensible human sense experience (and is such that various synthetic a priori structures can be known to hold for all possible experience in advance, unlike the regulative process above). Friedman would like to counter both Quine’s holism, which supposedly undermines all applications of an analytic/synthetic distinction, and the relativism implicit in Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. In GTR, Friedman’s three-part division of theoretical structures can be described as follows: the mathematical structure is the semi-Riemannian manifold, which constitutes the spatiotemporal framework of the theory; the equivalence and light principles of GTR form the coordinating principles that link the mathematical structures to the theory’s empirical laws (respectively, the constancy of the velocity of light coordinates physical phenomena with the manifold’s infinitesimally Minkowskian metric, and the equivalence principle coordinates the paths of “test particles” with the metric’s geodesics); finally, there are the empirical laws, such as Einstein’s field equations, which are only rendered  empirically meaningful by the constitutive function of the mathematical structures and coordinating principles (and thus serve as a relativized a priori framework, contra Quine). Friedman contends that, through an analysis of the progressive historical development of these constitutive structures, “we can thus view the evolution of succeeding paradigms or frameworks as a convergent series, as it were, in which we successively refine our constitutive principles in the direction of ever greater generality and adequacy” (2001, 63), which thereby undermines Kuhnian relativism. As for the difference between Friedman’s approach and Cassirer’s:
Cassirer . . . does not defend a relativized conception of a priori principles. Rather, what is absolutely a priori are simply those principles that remain throughout the ideal limiting process. . . . The present conception [Friedman’s] results from combining the relativized yet still constitutive a priori developed within the logical empiricist tradition with the Marburg version of the regulative use of reason. (66n)


2. ESR and The Neo-Kantian Tradition. 2.1. The “No Miracles” Argument. From an ontological standpoint, the main concern with any type of Kantian construction, whether Neo-Kantian or not, centers upon the threat of a virulent subjective idealism, or solipsism, which would entail that any and all theoretical constructions are equally possible. Friedman would like to avoid these nagging ontological worries, no doubt, which is probably the motivation for his pursuit of a theory of scientific rationality, with its epistemological (rather than ontological) overtones. Nevertheless, Friedman would also like to avoid any discussion of scientific truth: towards the end of his Stanford lectures, he comments that his “conception of scientific rationality does not involve a parallel conception of scientific truth—either ‘realist’ or ‘anti-realist’” (68n; which also explains why his theory is consistent with anti-realism, but does not require it). Yet, even if the examination of science is transferred to the ontologically-rarefied heights of rationality, there still remains the faint residue of ontological implications. In particular, Friedman, as well as Cassirer, simply assume that the historical evolution of our best scientific theories will converge to a, presumably, finite set of relativized a priori structures (or, for Cassirer, invariant mathematical laws). Friedman hypothesis requires, first, “that earlier constitutive frameworks are exhibited as limiting cases, holding approximately in certain precisely defined special conditions, of later ones”, and, second, that “the concepts and principles of later paradigms . . . evolve continuously, by a series of natural transformations, from those of earlier ones” (63). Given his less demanding philosophical agenda (i.e., no theory of rationality or constitutive frameworks), Cassirer is committed to the somewhat less extravagant convergence of mere mathematical structure within physical laws (i.e., Friedman’s first criterion), as Friedman’s brief synopsis of Cassirer’s philosophy makes clear: “since induction is a process of generalizations, aiming to subsume individual facts under ever more universal laws, it does not rest content with any particular set of laws, but attempts to subsume even the most general laws, in such a way that the most general laws at an earlier stage are exhibited as approximate special cases of the still more general laws at a later stage” (Friedman 2005, 76). 
Put simply, the problem for both Friedman and Cassirer is Hume’s problem of induction, for there seems to be no justification for assuming that the series of structures will continue to converge, rather than, say, diverge or ceaselessly fluctuate. For instance, it is possible that the laws of all of the separate sciences (e.g., physics, biology, psychology) may not be subsumable within a more general invariant law; or, it is conceivable that, within a particular science, an earlier law may not be subsumed within a later law as a special case of that later law (e.g., the succession of later successful laws may forever fail to subsume the empirical data of previously successful laws, resulting in a science with a set of smaller isolated or local laws that cannot be brought under an all inclusive law). Therefore, as the defender of the ESR brand of realism will insist (gleefully, no doubt), the presumption of a converging series has a slender, but important, ontological ramification; namely, that the “real” world is such that our mathematical scientific theories do, in fact, converge (as opposed to diverge, etc.). Yet, as discussed above, the claim that the invariant structures preserved over scientific change are grounded upon, or consequences of, the underlying world (= world ontology) is the central thesis of ESR, which thus secures its convergence prediction. Consequently, there seems little substantive difference between both Cassirer’s and Friedman’s neo-Kantianism and ESR. 
In fact, to stipulate that the structures of theories converge is tantamount to endorsing the “no miracles” argument, since this argument, construed minimally, predicts this convergence, i.e., such that it is not merely an historical accident. The anti-realist position, in contrast (see section 1.1), would likely refrain from making any such convergence prediction, thus Friedman is not correct in maintaining that his theory (or Cassirer’s, for that matter) is neutral between the realist and anti-realist positions. Unless the anti-realists would welcome a blurring of their thesis with a sophisticated structural realism, invoking a future-directed convergence of scientific structures falls clearly on the realist side of the realism/anti-realism debate, since “empirical adequacy” would seem to be satisfied by any and all patterns of future-oriented scientific laws as regards convergence or non-convergence. More specifically, the anti-realist philosophy seems consistent with the situation, described above, where the future successful theories in a particular science fragment into a series of incommensurable “local” laws, such that each is confined to a restricted set of non-overlapping phenomena, and where the combined empirical data of all of these laws are not subsumable within a larger law (e.g., if no successor “quantum gravity” theory is ever found to incorporate GTR and Quantum Theory, or Kepler’s planetary laws and Galileo’s free-fall law were never conjoined within Newtonian gravitational theory).​[1]​ Finally, and briefly, Friedman’s second criterion, that constitutive frameworks should emerge rationally from previous frameworks, is not sufficient in itself to blunt the force of the radical Kuhnian incommensurability problem. There are many instances of the rational development of constitutive frameworks within traditions that we would regard as running counter to the goals of science, broadly conceived: for example, the “irreducible complexity” thesis in the current Intelligent Design movement can be plausibly interpreted as crystallizing, in a rational manner, the many earlier, less developed, “design” notions utilized in previous Creation theories—thus, Friedman’s “rationality” criterion is unfortunately satisfied in this case.
2.2. The “Multiple Routes” Objection to ESR. In all fairness, Friedman does not discount all forms of realism, rather, he rejects the view that science is evolving towards a final, single conception of entities and/or structures. There is “an essential element of convergence in the historical evolution of successive constitutive frameworks”, he concludes, but insists that “this is explicitly not convergence to an entirely independent “reality” (however conceived) but rather convergence within the evolving sequence of constitutive frameworks itself.” Indeed, he judges that his “conception of scientific rationality does not even require that there be a uniquely correct sequence of convergent successor theories—something that would certainly be required by any version of ‘scientific realism’”. Friedman does admit “an element of ‘internal’ realism or what Kant called ‘empirical realism’”, since “once a given constitutive framework is already in place, there is a perfectly precise sense in which we can then speak of a ‘matching’ or ‘correspondence’ between a theory formulated within that framework and the empirical or phenomenal world” (2001, 118). In other words, Friedman only demands “that any reasonable route through [constitutive principles] be convergent”, which implies there can be more than one route (68).
In response, the ESR supporter will point out that merely allowing for multiple constitutive frameworks does not free Friedman’s theory from the necessity of acknowledging the ontological constraints imposed on theoretical constructions, i.e., that there are “external” (real world) factors that constrain theory construction but which cannot be accurately tracked from within theories. Put differently, Friedman’s multiple routes hypothesis still faces the threat of subjective idealism (or relativism, solipsism), unless, of course, he admits that there are constraints in place to guarantee that not all constitutive frameworks, or all routes within a single framework, are candidates for his inter-theoretic version of realism. If any and all frameworks, and routes through a single framework, are equally constructible and successful, then scientific theorizing would indeed appear to be a mere subjective creation—Why?: because frameworks that directly contradict one another, say,  and , would be equally compatible with the same evidence, and thereby support a relativist construal of these frameworks. To borrow Laudan’s distinction (1996, 42), Friedman’s appeal to multiple routes would seem an admission of non-uniqueness (more than one framework) rather than egalitarianism (all frameworks). But, even if the successful frameworks comprise a finite set, as opposed to just one, that still means that the majority of constructible frameworks are not successful—and thus an explanation is required to account for why some are successful and other are not. The realist would explain this failure of egalitarianism in terms of the constraints imposed by the world’s ontology, of course (see below).
The multiple routes objection runs counter to entity realism, needless to say, since that thesis must defend the view that science is ultimately grounded upon a single, final ontological class of entities. But, structural realism, and ESR in particular, need not endorse a corresponding final structure—and, in fact, there may be good reasons for endorsing the possibility of multiple routes, especially within spacetime theoretical constructions. First, the minimal interpretation of ESR does not rule out the possibility that there can be more than one invariant structure preserved over the course of scientific change; rather, it only holds that these invariant structures are grounded upon the world’s ontology. (Cassirer’s theory would seem consistent with the multiple routes hypothesis, as well, although only a single route is the apparent default view.) The construction of different spacetime theories upon the same empirical basis is well-known in philosophy of physics circles, of course, as famously initiated by Poincaré’s example (1905) of the alternative spatiotemporal interpretations of his disc-world inhabitants. Two theoretical constructions are consistent with the evidence obtained on the disc-world: (1) that the geometry is Euclidean but “universal forces” distort the measuring apparatus, or (2), the geometry is non-Euclidean and there are no such universal forces. The lesson for the structuralists, in addition to comprising an early instance of the underdetermination of theories, is that it is the “geometry + physics”, G + P, that faces the tribunal of experience, and not simply the geometrical structure, G , alone. Spacetime structures, like all of the mathematical apparatus, must be coordinated to physical processes—and this leaves open the possibility that, in the limit of scientific theorizing, more than one G + P combination may be consistent with the empirical evidence.​[2]​ 
The multiple routes version of ESR has two requirements. First, the G + P combinations must be non-unique rather than egalitarian, since, as above, admitting any and all such combinations would threaten realism/objectivism. In the Poincaré’s example, not all aspects of the choice between (1) and (2) are conventional. If one decides to retain a flat space, then one must postulate strange forces that distort the measuring instruments. On the other hand, if one decides to directly accept these measurements, then one must conclude that the space is curved. Consequently, once you have conventionally chosen a framework (respectively, that the space is flat or that the meter sticks provide accurate measurements), it is determined what conclusions you can reach about the world. Given a strong form of relativism/subjectivism, however, any geometry, and all assumptions about measuring instruments, should equally apply: for instance, option (3), that the geometry is Euclidean but no universal forces distort the apparatus. That this option is falsified by observational experience thus discloses the presence of “constraints” imposed on theory construction, constraints that seemingly comes from “outside” the particular theoretical framework chosen by the scientist (since the framework itself cannot determine these constraints in advance). By appealing to the underlying ontology of the world, the scientific realist can thus provide a natural explanation for the manifest experience of theoretical constraints, whereas Friedman’s rationality hypothesis must simply accept these constraints as merely inexplicable brute facts.
The second requirement for a multiple routes formulation of ESR is that each G + P combination must, from its perspective, be interpreted as an invariant feature across all of the other combinations, G´ + P´, that makeup the nonunique class of successful spacetime theories (so as to defeat the pessimistic meta-induction). That is, each G + P combinations must approximately contain all of the empirical data and predictions of all other G´ + P´ combinations; and, returning to Poincaré’s example, the “flat space plus forces” theory does indeed approximate empirically the “curved space without forces” theory, and visa verse. (A similar restriction must be in place for Friedman’s multiple routes hypothesis of scientific rationality.)
Friedman’s analysis is thus informative for structural realists since it discloses the importance of all the constitutive elements in scientific theories, both mathematical structures and coordinating principles, when searching for invariant structure. The multiple routes formulation of ESR does, however, account for the nonuniqueness of the multiple routes in much more satisfactory manner. Finally, it should be noted that, in the limit of scientific theorizing, it may turn out that only one geometric structure, G, from within one G + P pair, is consistent with the evidence and/or the scientific method’s list of theoretical virtues, so ESR is not committed to a multiple routes outcome.

3. Conclusion. To round out our investigation, there is an interesting method by which the multiple routes hypothesis of constructing scientific theories can be meshed with the original structuralist insight concerning invariant mathematical/geometric structure. In particular, is the multiple routes hypothesis itself subsumed under, or an instance of, a geometric invariant? The question is of more than mere mathematical curiosity. The ESR view is that the underlying ontology is responsible for the convergence of scientific theories (“no miracles” argument), as represented by the presence of mathematical invariants across theory change. Hence, this convergence can be interpreted as a constraint on the progression of scientific theories. But, since the multiple routes form of ESR also appeals to constraints in theory construction (e.g., cases (1) and (2) are admissible, but not (3)), a parity of reasoning should dictate that the multiple routes hypothesis should also be represented by a mathematical invariant.
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^1	  A number of objections can be raised at this point. First, the neo-Kantian might claim that a mathematical invariant can always be found that links the totality of empirical data, thus rejecting the possibility just noted (although, as a counter-reply, this may be difficult to prove). Second, the anti-realist might insist that empirical adequacy dictates that all empirical data must be subsumed by more general laws (if not, empirical adequacy would be sacrificed). However, as argued previously, this demand would render anti-realism practically indistinguishable from ESR, since it basically admits that scientific laws must converge—and modal claims of this sort cannot ignore their ontological implications, even if minimal.  
^2	  Although it comprises a separate topic, a famous counter-argument against structural realism should be briefly addressed at this point. As originally raised by M. Newman, a version of the argument, for the Semantic view of theories, is as follows: if a mathematical structure (model) represent the world by standing in an isomorphic relationship with the world, then one can undermine the uniqueness of the representation by introducing another world domain of the same cardinality, and carving out a structure that is also isomorphic to the model in this new domain. As argued by French and Saatsi (2004), however, this problem of unintended models can be overcome by including interpretations of the model’s theoretical variables, so that they refer to properties and relations in the real world. This reply to the Newman problem thus parallels Poincaré’s insight, i.e., that structures are always linked to the world via coordinating principles—and hence the G + P approach to structure naturally includes the French-Saatsi defense. Friedman has himself contributed to the Newman argument, see, Demopoulos and Friedman 1985. See, also, Slowik 2005, for more on spacetime and structural realism.      
